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Defamation - Absolute Immunity
INTRODUCTION
With the tremendous expansion of governmental functions in
the last twenty years and with the great "sport" of legislative
investigations at their peak, it becomes very important to take a
long and careful look at the area of immunity from action for
defamatory statements. The area of absolute immunity is suppos-
edly very narrow and limited only to actions of the utmost public
importance.' However, there has been a marked expansion of this
"privilege".2
Absolute immunity may be defined in this manner:
... an absolutely privileged communication is one in re-
spect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the
matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be
had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon a per-
son who claims to be injured thereby, and even though it
may have been made maliciously.3 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the only major difference between an absolute and a quali-
fied immunity is that in a qualified immunity case the statement
must have been made in good faith; while in an absolute immunity
case, the motives of the speaker are irrelevant.4 The severity of the
immunity makes evident the reason for the narrow scope of ap-
plication. Absolute immunity is for this reason held to be limited
to judicial, high legislative and top-level executive proceedings."
For purposes of analysis, however, and in actuality, the scope of
absolute immunity is broader than that and should be classified
under the following categories: 0
(a) consent of the person defamed
(b) judicial proceedings
(c) legislative proceedings
(d) executives and other public officials
(e) administrative proceedings
(f) communication between husband and wife
If this classification were used it would help to solve the muddle
1 CooLY, ToRTs 525 (4th ed. 1932); 33 Azi. Jun. LIBEL Am SLaDR §125; 25
0. Jun. LimEL AND SrLADER §56.
2 See notes 198, 199, infra.
3 33 Am . Jun. LIBEL AND SLANDER §125.
425 0. JuR. LiBEL AND SLANDER § §58, 69.
5 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 580, 37 NYE.2d 584, 588 (1941);
Meyer v. Parr, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 467, 469, 19 Ohio Op. 543, 545 (1941);
COoLEY, ToRTs 532 (4th ed. 1932).
6 For similar categorization, see: PlossEn, TORTS 821-831 (1941); RESTATE-
mexT, Tors §§583-592.
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which usually arises in the administrative area.7
Basically the granting or refusal of immunity is a balancing
problem. The problem in this area is the same as that which is
the underlying theory of our governmental structure, i.e.,
the never ending struggle to strike a perfect balance between the
rights of the individual on the one hand, and the needs of the
society on the other.8 Thus, in determining whether an immunity
will be extended, it will be necessary to look at the injury to the
individual's reputation, and then determine if the injury is out-
weighed by an overriding public interest. That careful considera-
tion must be given to the injury to personal reputation is noted
by the Ohio Constitution in the following words:
... every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,
person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of
law.. .9 (Emphasis added)
This provision does not forbid all "privileges," but it should always
be the starting point, and it is for the courts to determine if public
interest is great enough to overcome this barrier. The courts have
lost sight of the balancing approach because of a definite "harden-
ing of the arteries" in the established areas of judicial ° and legis-
lative ' immunities, and, when the courts are faced with a new
sector for applying or denying immunity, they decide the issue
by analogy to the established areas.'2 There will always be new
cases arising on the fringe13 and possibly whole new areas, like
the administrative branch,' 4 presenting unique problems. Of course,
this does not mean the decisions in the established areas should
be completely disregarded, but it does mean that absolute immunity
should not depend on how closely the new proceeding "mirrors"
some type of proceeding where immunity has already been granted.
This may be illustrated by two rather extreme hypotheticals. First
7 Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St., 89, 67 N.E. 152, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 119, 62
LILA. 477 (1903); Meyer v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637, 34 Ohio
L. Abs. 448, 24 Ohio Op. 110 (1941); Beatty v. Baston, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 481
(1932). These cases all try to solve the problem of administrative immunity
by looking at analogies of executive or judicial immunity, instead of go-
ing directly to the problem and deciding whether an immunity should be
extended.
8 FEmmumsm AS A DEMnocnRArc PRocEss 28 (1942).
9 OHIO CONST., Aer. I § 16.
'OLiles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631 (1885), definitely determined that an
absolute privilege exists in judicial proceedings.
11 Omo CowsT. Arm. II §12.
12 See note 5, supra.
13 Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 49 N.W.2d
521 (1951). Pre-trial conversation of an attorney with a witness, held not ab-
solutely privileged.
14 Comment, 97 U. or PA. L. REv. 887 (1948-49); Note 18 Oxax. L. REv.
1138 (1947).
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assume a defamatory statement made before a municipal agency
for granting dog licenses which followed all of the procedures which
are practiced in our courts. Secondly, the same statement made
before a Federal administrative agency whose determinations
vitally affected the life of every citizen in this country, and al-
though the agency had adopted procedural safeguards, they were
not like those used by the courts. It is clear that the second situa-
tion presents a case where absolute immunity should be extended,
while the first is clearly not such a situation. But if the analogy
approach was strictly adhered to, the result would be just the
opposite. The proper approach, then, in these new areas is to de-
termine what is the policy reason for granting the immunity and
how does this compare with the injury done to the defamed per-
son's reputation, always keeping in mind the strong policy state-
ment of the Due Process Clause of the Ohio Constitution.Y
The use of the word "privilege" to describe the bar to recovery
in defamation cases has been "fair game" for legal theorists.16 The
suggestion is that "immunity" is a much more accurate and proper
term. "Privilege" seems to indicate something undemocratic that
belongs to a favored class as pointed out by this definition:
A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by
a person, company, or class, beyond the common advant-
ages of other citizens .... 17
Inherent in this definition is another real criticism of the use of
"privilege." The idea is conveyed that the right to defame extends
to a particular person no matter what the circumstances were
under which the statement was made, instead of the concept that
the right would extend to any person who made a defamatory
statement under the proper circumstances,18 as is actually the case.
An additional reason for using the term "immunity" becomes
evident from reading several Ohio cases. 19 These cases seemingly
confuse the exclusionary privilege in the law of evidence with the
immunity extended to the defamer in tort law. In the Tapplin-Rice-
Clerkin Co. case2° the defendant uttered defamatory statements
about plaintiff while testifying before a grand jury. Plaintiff
brought an action for malicious prosecution. The court held that
statements before a grand jury are absolutely privileged; and
15 See note 9, supra.
18 Pnossm, TORTS 822 n. 30 (1941); Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defama-
tan Cases: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COL. L. Rnv. 463, 467-4M8 (1909).
17 Bx.cK, LAW DiCTIONARY 1359 (1951).
18 Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation Cases: Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 9 COL. L. Rzv. 463 (1909).
19 Taplhn-Rice-Clerkin Co. v. Hower, 124 Ohio St. 123, 177 NXE. 203
(1931); Lamprecht v. Crane, 5 Ohio Dec. 753 (1880).
20 bid.
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therefore, any evidence concerning statements made was inadmis-
sable. Plaintiff in this case was unable to recover because he could
not prove one element of his cause of action, i.e., the defamatory
statements. This is the ordinary effect of an evidentiary privilege.
But the basic principle of absolute immunity for defamation cases
is that the plaintiff has established a case of actionable defamation,
but because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the de-
fendant at the time he made the defamatory remarks, plaintiff will
not be able to recover.21 The question of immunity should not
even be raised unless plaintiff can establish his cause of action.22
Evidence of the statements should be admitted, and then defendant
should attempt to establish a situation for the application of in-
munity. The term "immunity" carries a more proper connotation,
and should he exclusively used in defamation cases.
A difficult problem in the immunity cases is determining the
question of whether the matter is pertinent or relevant to the pur-
pose for which the privilege is extended. For the present, it will
be sufficient to say that the requirement of relevancy has been
greatly liberalized.2 This liberalization raises the question of
balancing the interests presented before, but the problem of ap-
plication, as will be discussed under the appropriate headings,
of strict rules of relevance have caused the courts to be very
liberal in what they hold to be relevant.24
The question of what is the function of the court and jury with
respect to absolute immunity is rather simple in theory. Theoretical-
ly, the court will give the law on every fact situation, thus the
question of immunity is always decided by the court.25 This rule
is almost unanimously applied where the facts are conceded - the
court will in such cases decide the question of immunity. The
real problems arise when the facts involved in determining the
immunity are disputed. An understanding of the problem can be
obtained from this syllabus:
Where the defense to an action for libel is that the publi-
cation was privileged, and issue is joined upon the allega-
tions of fact on which the alleged privilege depends, the
2125 0. JuR. Lam, A SLA&wDE § 56.
22 Note 78 A.L.R. 1182 (1932).
2 3 Restatement, Torts §585, Comment e and the subsequent sections and
their statements on relations of statement to proceedings. It is not to be
inferred that these statements in the Restatement represents the law as it
stands at present, but rather that the "any relation" test indicates the direc-
tion in which the courts are moving.
2433 An. Jum. LmEi M SLAmEm §184.
2S Note 26 A.L.R. 830 (1923).
261Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152, 62 L.R.A. 477 (1903);
Anderson v. Griffis, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 246 (1929); Southard v. Morris, 14 Ohio
N.P., N.S., 465, 31 Ohio Dec. 634 (1913).
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issue is for the jury, and a refusal to instruct them that
the publication was privileged, is not error.2'
This statement is clearly correct if it stands for the proposition
that the jury must decide the facts and then apply the law that
was given to them. On the other hand, if the statement should mean
the jury was to determine the confines of immunity, it is plainly
erroneous. The judge should give hypotheticals on all possible re-
sults, and direct whether the statements would be immune under
those circumstances. 28 Ohio apparently has adopted this proper
and better approach.29
Excessive publication involves the problem of whether the
statement is within the immunity. The term "excess of privilege'
has two aspects.30 The first is to decide whether the statement
properly relates to the "privileged occasion." 31 This is just another
term for the requirement of relevancy, and will be of definite
interest in studying absolute immunity. Giving this task a name
tag does not help much and the choice of terms here may well be
confusing. The second aspect involves a case where the statement
is within the privilege, but because of its abusive or improper
nature the question is raised whether it should be immune. This
type of "excess" generally goes to the jury as evidence of malice,8 2
and is therefore irrelevant to any question raised in the area of
absolute immunity. Most of the discussions of excess of privilege
are involved in the area of qualified immunity and need not be
extensively discussed here. The judge has the function of telling
the jury whether the privilege had been exceeded. Whether it is
the judge's function or that of the jury when analyzed is simply
the usual problem of distinguishing questions of law from ques-
tions of fact and is not a special difficulty of the iminuity cases.
Ordinarily, immunity is in the nature of an affirmative de-
fense and must be averred by the defendant in his answer in order
to raise the issue.3 3 However, if the facts stated in the plaintiff's
petition clearly present a privileged occasion, the court will rule
on the immunity upon the filing of a demurrer by the defendant.3 4
It is very likely that a demurrer will be sustained in the area of
27 The Post Publishing Co. v. Maloney, 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 NE. 921 (1893)
(Syllabus of the Court 3).
28A. Jum. Tim AND SLANDER §§183-190; note 26 AL.R. 830 (1923).
29 25 0. JuR. LmEL Am SLrNER §57; see notes 25, 26, supra.
3ONote 26 A.L.R. 843 (1923).
31 For a definition of "privileged occasion" see, Bigelow v. Brumley,
138 Ohio St. 574, 587, 37 N.E.2d 584, 591 (1941).3 2 Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So. 34, 26 A.LR 813 (1923); 33
Am. Jim. LBEL AN SLANDER §186.
33 PRossER, ToRTs 822 (1941).
34 Ginsberg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951); Bueher v. Prudential
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 NX.. 25 (1931).
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absolute immunity if the petition has fully stated the facts, because
of the definite scope of absolute immunity and the insignificance
of good faith.35 The court may find absolute immunity even though
the irrelevancy of the statement is specifically alleged.36
CONSENT OF THE PERSON DEFAMED
In defamation, as in many other areas of tort,3 T consent by the
person injured is, under normal circumstances, an absolute bar
to recovery.38 Several authorities have classified consent of the
party defamed as an absolute immunity.39 If immunity is used in
its broadest sense to mean immunity from action for normally
defamatory statements, then consent should be included. Also,
since immunity is a balancing process between private rights and
needs of society,40 the weight on the public side may be very light
since the defamed party has consented to the injury to his reputa-
tion. However, it would be more practical to treat consent as a
separate defense. Immunity imparts the notion of an actionable
wrong, but because of circumstances surrounding the defamer re-
covery is barred.41 On the other hand, the consent theory is that
there is no tort in the first place because of the action of the party
defamed.42 Common understanding will be better served if this
distinction is maintained in the defamation cases, even if the dif-
ference is only slight and very technical.
If the defendant, at plaintiff's request, reports libelous state-
ments he has heard, the statements will be immune. 43 If the plain-
tiff induces the defendant to make the statements so that an
action in slander can be brought, the rule is:
... in a civil action a party cannot be allowed to recover
damages for a libel which he procurred or instigated to be
published against himself for the purpose of laying the
foundation of a law suit for his own pecuniary gain .... 44
35 Preusser v. Faulhaber, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. 312 (1909); Rudin v. Fauver, 9
Ohio N.P., N.S., 289 (1909), af'd 23 Ohio Cir. Dec. 315, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S.,
30 (1909), and cases cited note 34, supra.
S6 Ginsberg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951).
-37PsossEn, TORTS 117-125 (1941). The usual rules applying to consent
are also applicable to defamation and will not be treated at length in this
comment.
.38Shinglemeyer v. Wright, 124 Mich. 230, 82 N.W. 887, 50 L.R AL 129
(1900), Noted 14 HAnv. L. REV. 225 (1900-01); PsossER, ToRTs 830 (1941); RE-
sTAzmENT, ToRTs §583.
3 9 PRosSER, TORTS 830 (1941), RlsTAITEmX, TORTS §583.
40 See note 8, supra.
4125 0. Jur. LTam AND SLAmmER §56.
42Paossm, TouRs 117 (1941): "It [consent] is not, strictly speaking, a
privilege, or even a defense, but goes to negate the existence of any tort in
the first instance." (Emphasis added.)
43 RESTATEm=rT, TORTS §583; Note, 14 Hav. L. REv. 225 (1900-01).
44Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47, 54, 127 Pac. 533, 536 (1912), Noted
61 U. or PA. L. RLv. 422 (1912-13).
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These two cases may well show the basis for distinguishing privi-
lege from consent. In the first case, where plaintiff is seeking to
discover the source of the defamation, he has a real interest in
discovering the source, and the defendant should have a privilege.
In the case involving an attempt to get a cause of action, there is
no public policy served by the defendant's publication, therefore
the bar to recovery must be based solely on the principle of volenti
non fit injuria.
There is one exception to the rule that consent will bar re-
covery.4 5 This exception is set out in Richardson v. Gundy46 as fol-
lows:
If however the plaintiff instigated or set on foot the
inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether the de-
fendant... was disseminating evil reports concerning
[plaintiff], in order that such influences might be counter-
acted or for any other purpose and not for the purpose of
predicating an action in his own behalf, he was not estop-
ped from maintaining an action.47
Preventing republication,48 or requiring justification or retrac-
tion49 are the basic requirements of the exception. The best factual
situation for the application of this exception is Shinglemeyer v.
Wright" in which the defendant accused the plaintiff of stealing
his bicycle, plaintiff called a policeman and had defendant repeat
the charge to the officer. The Michigan court held that the com-
munication was privileged. This may be explained because it was
a statement to a policeman, but if not, an action for slander should
have been allowed.
The publication must be kept within the scope of the consent, 1
and perhaps a request for a statement will give no consent to pub-
lish a defamatory matter to a third party.52 The consent need not
be expressed, but may, for example, arise from a person's mem-
bership in an organization. 3
No matter what classification it is given, the attorney should
4SRESTATEMENT, TORTS §584.
4 6 See note 44, supra.
47 88 Kan. 47, 54, 127 Pac. 533, 536.
48 Rr5ATEmmnT, TORTS §584.
49Note 14 HAv. L. Rav. 225 (1900-01).
50 124 Mich. 230, 82 N.W. 887, 50 L.R.A. 129 (1900).
SI RESTATEmm=aT, ToRTs §583, Comment d.
S2 Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), Noted 6 Cornell L. Q.
430 (1920-21). In this case plaintiff requested a letter of recommendation. De-
fendant dictated a defamatory letter to his stenographer. The letter Vas
sent to plaintiff. Held for plaintiff.
S3 Chapman v. Ellesmere [1923] 2 K.B. 431, opinion of Slesser, T. J., be-
ginning at p. 457. Held, by joining the Jockey Club, the plaintiff consented
to the publication of his suspension in the official racing newspaper. Slesser
said this was a privileged communication on the basis of consent p. 467.
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be aware that the theory of consent applies to defamation cases,
and may well be a way to bar recovery.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Language used in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,
whether by the judge, a party, counsel, grand or petit jurors, of
witnesses is "privileged" if it be relevant to the matter under con-
sideration, and if the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter.54
The immunity in judicial proceedings is an absolute bar to recovery
in an action for libel or slander, notwithstanding any malicious
intent on the part of the speaker.5 This is the general rule which
had its origin early in English judicial history56 and has been only
slightly modified since.57 It must be kept in mind that the origins
of judicial immunity and legislative immunity were separate and
distinct and that probably the executive immunity came later
through the process of analogy.58
The immunity of the judge59 is based on the same policy which
gives him immunity from all civil action for acts done within the
scope of his judicial capacity.6 0 The necessity that our judges be
given complete independence to act without fear of vexacious liti-
gation is the reason the immunity is absolute. It represents an-
other attempt to keep our judges impartial. The judge's privilege
is the broadest in the judicial proceeding, and it is doubtful that
he would be questioned unless the statement was clearly irrelevant
or beyond the purview of his judicial duties.61 Immunity would,
S4 Llles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631 (1885).
5SKinter v. Kinter, 84 Ohio App. 399, 87 N.E.2d 379, 39 Ohio Op. 517
(1949).
56 Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation Cases: Judicial Proceed-
ing, 9 COL. L. lEv. 463, 474 (1909).
S7 The only noticeable modification in this country has been the addition of
the requirement of relevancy. Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E.
152, 62 LI.A. 477 (1903); PRossER, Tons 825 (1941).
S8 Compare: Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamatio Cases: Judicial
Proceeding, 9 COL. L. REv. 463, 474 (1909), (Judicial immunity history); with
Yankwick, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and
Scope, 99 U. or PA. L. REv. 960 (1950-51), Legislative immunity history).
For history of executive immunity, See, Veeder, Absolute Immunity In
Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 COL. L. REV. 131, 141
(1910).
59 Childs v. Voris, 6 Ohio Dec. 75, 4 Ohio N.P. 67 (1897). Judge of com-
mon pleas court held not liable for language used in deciding a case over
which the court has jurisdiction. RESTATEME, TORTS §585.
60PaossR, Torrs 151 (1941); RESTATEmENT, TORTS §585 Comment g.
61 Child v. Voris, 6 Ohio Dec. 75, 4 Ohio N.P. 67 (1897). Judge made
statements as to why he would not appoint plaintiff as defense counsel in a
criminal case, held absolutely privileged. See Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho
548, 255 P.2d 707 (1953). Conferences between judge and attorney about case
which is never tried are absolutely privileged. NmvELr, SLAwmDE AmD LiE.
392-393 (4th ed. 1924), says relevancy rule does not apply to judges in the
United States.
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no doubt, extend to justices of the peace,62 appellate judges, 63 and
other public officers when they are performing a judicial function"
as well as to trial court judges in Ohio. Do not assume from this
that there are no sanctions for punishing judges who abuse their
discretion. Judges may be impeached,65 removed 6 or disbarred T
for improper conduct, and there are of course strict ethical rules
relating to the conduct of judges.68 Besides this many judicial of-
fices are elective. Impeachment and removal6 9 of judges, however,
are very rare. The available "reins" to check a judge are very
weak, and properly so.
Grand70 and petit 71 jurors are given an absolute immunity on
the same policy grounds as the judges' immunity, i.e., independence
and impartiality in trying the facts. Besides this reason, there is
also the practical difficulty of getting good juries, and if a juror
were subject to a harassing civil action for any statements made,
it would be almost impossible to impanel a jury. The same require-
ment exists here that the statement be pertinent and that it be
spoken while the juror was performing a proper function. 72 A report
of a grand jury will probably only be immune if a specific charge
or indictment is returned.73 This seems to be too strict a view and
it would be better to grant an immunity to the grand jury for any
62 Liles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631 (1885); Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 701,
58 S.E.2d 68 (1950). These cases and those in the next two notes say the pro-
ceedings are judicial; therefore it may be presumed the presiding official
would have the judge's immunity.
6 3 Wilson v. Whitacre, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 392, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 15 (189).
64 Meyer v. Parr, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 467, 19 Ohio Op. 543, 6 Ohio Supp. 209
(1941), reversed 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 448, 24
Ohio Op. 110 (1941) because the court felt it was an administrative not a
judicial, proceeding; See Beatty v. Baston, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 481 (1932) In-
dustrial Commission; Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P.2d 707 (1953).
Basing the decision in administrative cases on whether they exercise a ju-
dicial function is subject to criticism, but the courts have followed this view.
65 OHIo CoNsT. AR. 11. §§23, 24.
6 6 OHO CoNsT. Am. 11. §38; OHIo CoNsT. ART. IV. §17; Omo R-v. CODE
§§3.03 3.08 (10-1, 10-2).6 7 In re Copland, 66 Ohio App. 304, 33 N.E.2d 857 (1940). Municipal judge
disbarred for publishing a fictitious report of a case.
68 Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association.
69 In re Bostwick, 29 Ohio N.P., N.S., 22 (1931) aff'd 43 Ohio App.
76, 181 N.E. 905 (1931); See 125 Ohio St. 182, 180 N.E. 713 (1931). This is
the only clear case of removal found, and no impeachment cases were dis-
covered.
70Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933); Griffith v.
Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896); RPSTATEmE=, Toms §589.
71Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1 (1869); NEwEL, SLANrm AiND ImM 406
(4th ed. 1924); RESTATEE-,T, ToRTs §589.
7 2 RESTATimENT, ToRTs §589 Comments b, c, e.
7 3 Bennett v. Stockwell, 197 Mich. 50, 163 N.W. 482 (1917).
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report74 unless they were given warning by the presiding official
that such a report was not a part of their function and would not
be protected. 75 Laymen who are performing such a vital function
should not be held to such strict and technical standards. Proceed-
ings before a grand jury are considered to be judicial in nature;
therefore witnesses7 6 and attorneys77 appearing before such group
will be extended an absolute immunity. There are apparently no
specific sanctions for punishing a juror who uses abusive language,
except that a juror may be cited for contempt of court.78
Counsel will be given absolute immunity for relevant state-
ments made preliminary to,79 or as a part of, a judicial proceeding
in which he is acting.80 There are two underlying policy reasons
for granting this immunity. The first is quite similar to the basis
for the judge and jury immunities, i.e., that an attorney is an of-
ficer of the court and for that reason should be given great freedom
of action.8 1 This reason carries the least weight and is not men-
ioned very often. The second ground for the immunity of the at-
torney arises out of a person's right to have free access to the courts.
This right has no real value unless the party is represented by an
attorney who has broad discretion in presenting the party's case in
the best possible light.8 2 If an absolute immunity is to be extended
to the parties to an action, it is obvious that their counsel should
also be safe from action. This should be an extremely broad privilege
and should not be destroyed because objections to the statements
are sustained or motions to strike from the pleadings are granted.
The immunity needs to be extended to activity outside the court
where an attorney represents his clients. An attorney is also given,
74 Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933).
75RESTATEmENT, TORTS §589 Comment e.
76 See Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. v. Hower, 124 Ohio St. 123, 177 N.E. 203,
81 A.L.R 1117 (1931). Witness testifying before a grand jury, held absolute-
ly privileged. From this it follows that a statement by a juror would be im-
mune; RESTATEmENT, TORTS §589 Comment f.
77 REsTATsEm , ToeRs §589 Comment d.
78 OsO REV. CODE §§ 705.01 et seq. (12136), especially 2705.02 (B)
(12137 (B)).
79 Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P.2d 707 (1953) adopts the "Re-
statement view," as to preliminary statements. Preusser v. Faulhaber, 23
Ohio Cir. Ct 312 (1909). Charged attorney with improper conduct prior
to commencement of disbarment proceedings, held absolutely privileged.
80OSouthard v. Morris, 14 Ohio N.P., N.S., 465, 31 Ohio Dec. 684 (1913);
Levy v. Littleford, 19 Ohio Dec. 604 (1909); RESTATEmEN, TORTS §586; 33
Am JuR. LiBL r Am SLAr- a §179. English rule: GATLEY, LImm AND SLAxDER
178 (4th ed. 1953). Only distinction is the relevency problem.
81 Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation Cases: Judicial Proceedings,
9 COL. L. REv. 463, 483 (1909).
82 Southard v. Morris, 14 Ohio N.?., N.S., 465, 467; 31 Ohio Dec. 684
(1913); see note 80, supra; RESTATEmENT, TORTS §586 Comment a.
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immunity for statements made in pleadings, affidavits, and briefs
which are relevant to the proceeding.83 Even if it be found that
the statements by counsel were defamatory, false, and irrelevant,
there will not be a basis for a libel action merely because the court
stenographer wrote the statement downA 4 Although an attorney
would not be subject to a civil action for pertinent defamatory
utterances, he would be limited to some extent by the sanctions
of contempt,8 5 suspension, removal, or reprimand, 0 for improper
behavior before the court. Although it must be admitted that these
sanctions do not do much to heal the injured person's reputation,
they will act as a deterrent.
In order that all people may have a free and unlimited access
to the courts, an absolute immunity applies to all relevant state-
ments made by a party either prior to or during the trial.8 7 This is
true even though the party is suing as an agent or in some other
representative capacity.88 Preliminary statements if relevant and
necessary will also be immune.8 9 It should be remembered that a
party may appear in an action as his own counsel and as a witness.
Which immunity will protect him when performing one of these
various functions is an unnecessary question since the scope of these
various immunities is practically coextensive. A party is not sub-
ject to an action for relevant material contained in his pleading. 0
Statements at conferences between attorney and party are privileged
but it is an evidentiary privilege and not an immunity from defama-
tion. Parties who become too abusive would be subject to punish-
ment for contempt.91 A further possibility for an alternative sanc-
tion would be an action for malicious prosecution. This action is
available in Ohio whether the action brought was criminal or civil.9 2
83 Rudin v. Fauver, 9 Ohio N.P., N.S., 289 (1909), aff'd 23 Ohio Cir. Dec.
315, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S., 30 (1909) affd 83 Ohio St. 468, 94 N.. 1114 (1910);
GATLEY, LIBEL AiD SLANDER 179 (4th ed. 1953); RETATmELET, TORTs §586 Com-
ment a; notes 16 A.L.R. 746 (1922); 32 A.L.R. 2d 423 (1953).84 Levy v. Littleford, 19 Ohio Dec. 604 (1909).
85 OHmo REv. CODE §§2705.01-2705.10 (12136-12147).
86 Oaio REv. CoDE §§4705.02, 4705.03 (1707, 1708); Hogan v. State Bar, 36
Cal. 2d807, 228 P.2d 554 (1951).87 Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E.
25 (1931), Allegation in a pleading; Erie County Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Crecelius,
122 Ohio St. 210, 171 N.E. 97 (1930), Pleading; RESTATnmsT, ToRTs §587; 33
Am. Jur. LamL AND SLamER §180. English view: GAmrr, Lmm Am SLANrmn
179 (4th ed. 1953).
8833 Am. Jun. LIBEL AND SLANDER §180; NVEIsw , SLANR AND LIBEL 399
(4th ed. 1924).89 Preusser v. Faulhaber, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. 312 (1909); PmsrAurTE=r,
TORTS §587.
90 See note 87, supra.
91 See note 85, supra.
92 Kintz v. HIarriger, 99 Ohio St. 240, 124 N.E. 168, 12 A.LR 140 (1919).
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Seemingly for quite some time in Ohio, the cloak of absolute im-
munity did not extend to malicious prosecution." However, in 1931,
the Supreme Court of Ohio, without distinguishing malicious prose-
cution from libel or slander, overruled the Kintz9" case and refused
to admit evidence from the prior action.95 Policy-wise there is no
public interest in having the courts available to carry out a person's
malice. Immunity assumes a proper action and thus, if statements
are pertinent, they will not be actionable. Malicious prosecution, on
the other hand, is aimed at the commencement of improper actions.
Therefore, it would be both consistent and proper to refuse an action
for libel or slander while allowing an action for malicious prosecu-
tion.
It is vital to any proper judicial system that it be able to obtain
the truth. In order to get the truth, witnesses must not feel hesitant
about testifying because of a fear that in so doing they will be sub-
jecting themselves to liability for damages or at least to the trouble
and expense of defending a civil action.96 For this reason courts
have generally extended an absolute immunity to witnesses for
pertinent testimony in the course of a judicial proceeding.9 7 Since
witnesses are not usually familiar with the technical rules of evi-
dence, the requirement of pertinency must be, and has been, liberal-
ly construed.08 If the statement is made in answer to an unobjected
question it should certainly be immune.99 Perhaps the only non-im-
mune statement should be one that is voluntarily offered by the
witness after he has been given warning that the statement is not
pertinent and will not be immune 00 or one that is obviously not
pertinent. This approach has a very significant advantage in being
easy to administer within the scope so clearly set out. Preliminary
interviews between counsel and witnesses are said to be absolutely
privileged. 10 ' This is clearly a defamation immunity and not an
evidentiary privilege. A witness, though free from an action for
93 Kintz v. Harriger, 99 Ohio St. 240, 124 N.E. 168, 12 A.L.R. 1240 (1919);
Lamprecht v. Crane, 5 Ohio Dec. 753 (1880).
94Ibid.
95 Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. v. Hower, 124 Ohio St 123, 177 N.E. 203 (1931).
Expressly overrules the Kintz case, but the court apparently misinterpreted it.
963Bickerstaff v. Hingsley, 1 Ohio App. 91, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S., 384
(1913); Emerman v. Bruder, 5 Ohio N.P. 31, 7 Ohio Dec. 311 (1897).
97 Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. v. Hower, 124 Ohio St. 123, 177 N.E. 203, 81
AL.L. 117 (1931); Liles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St 631 (1885); and cases cited note
96, supra.
98 In Emerwmn v. Bruder, 5 Ohio N.P. 31, 7 Ohio Dec. 311 (1897),
the court holds that they will presume pertinency if nothing to the contrary
is shown.
99 Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952).
100 REsTATEm , ToRTs §588.
101 Beresford v. White, 30 T.L.R. 591 (1914).
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slander, might be subject to punishment for contempt,10 2 perjury,10 3
and possibly even malicious prosecution. 0 4 These sanctions may well
curb the tongue of the most malicious witness.
Persons who are not actual participants in the judicial proceed-
ing are not extended an immunity. There is no policy argument
for granting protection to one who procures testimony and who is
not a necessary party to the proceeding. 0 5 One who bribes a witness
will not be given the absolute immunity of the witness.10 6 Apparent
conflicts may be resolved when from the facts it appears that a party
did the suborning. Under these circumstances the party is covered
by his own immunity and need not claim a vicarious immunity. 10 7
Relevant pleading, 08 briefs, 0 9 and affidavits,110 are absolutely
immune. It is merely a necessary part of the immunity extended
to a party to the action. Taking a deposition before a notary is not
considered a judicial proceeding; 1  therefore no absolute immunity
is extended.112 This seeming inconsistency may be reconciled by
noticing that the cases giving no privilege involve reports of the
deposition proceedings." 13 Official reports of judicial proceedings are
generally considered to be absolutely privileged.114 On the other
hand, newspaper reports and unofficial reporters are considered
to have only a conditional immunity."15
Courts are often presented with the problem of whether the
102 See note 78, supra.
103 Bickerstaff v. Hingsley, 1 Ohio App. 91, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S., 384 (1913).
1 04 The Taplin case, note 97, supra, makes this rather doubtful.
105 Note, 144 A.L.R. 633 (1943).
106 See, Bigelow v. Brunley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E. 2d 584, 21 Ohio
Op. 471 (1941). Person not a member of a committee not granted any immu-
nity.
107 Kinter v. Kinter, 84 Ohio App. 399, 87 N.E.2d 379, 39 Ohio Op. 517
(1949). Wife claiming husband took part in a conspiracy to defame her.
Note, 144 A.L.R. 633 (1943).
108 Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E.
25 (1931); The Erie County Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Crecelius, 122 Ohio St. 210,
171 N.E. 97 (1930); cf. Lanning v. Christy, 30 Ohio St. 115, 27 Am. Rep. 431
(1876). This case is just limited to its facts.
109 Note 32 A.L.R. 2d 423 (1953).
11OHarris v. Reams, 2 Ohio Dec. Repr. 281 (1860); Lamprecht v. Crane,
5 Ohio Dec. 753 (1880).
111 Note, 90 A.L.R. 66 (1934).
112 33 Air. Jum. L=EI Am SLimR §156.
113 Note, 90 A.L.R 66 (1934).
114 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E. 2d 584 (1941).
'
1 5 The Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95
N.E. 735, Ann. Cas., 1912 B, 978 (1911); Heimlich v. The Dispatch Printing Co.,
26 Ohio Dec. 234, 18 Ohio N.P., N.S., 505 (1916); The Post Publishing Co. v.
Maloney, 50 Ohio St 71, 33 N.E. 921 (1893). If the court has not acted on the
reported pleadings, no immunity at all. Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 84
Ohio St. 408, 95 N.E. 917, 38 L.R A., N.S., 1913 (1911).
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statement was actually made in the course of a judicial proceeding,
i.e., what is a judicial proceeding? The court in which the state-
ment is made must have jurisdiction of the subject matter."6 This
is a very impractical rule and a more practical solution would be
one which would not put the parties to the risk of determining the
jurisdiction." 7 One Ohio case 18 held that the immunity is not lost
where the court in which the defamation was made had no juris-
diction because the statute of limitations had run. Nor is there any
judicial proceeding until the court has taken action on the pleadings,
or papers, filed with the court." 9 It does not matter whether the
action is ex parte of inter parte. But if the defamation is spoken ex
parte during the selection of jurors, it will not be privileged.1 20
Actions before a justice of the peace are considered to be judi-
cial proceedings for the purpose of immunity.12 1 The proceedings
before grand juries are also included within the scope. 22 When a
court is either admitting 123 or disbarring 124 an attorney it is exercis-
ing its judicial capacity and the proceedings are therefore immune.
Although there is no direct authority in Ohio, lunacy proceedings
are ordinarily considered to be under the "umbrella" of immuni-
ty.12 5 Proceedings to obtain search warrants are generally consider-
ed to be judicial proceedings. 120 Military tribunals have also been
granted an immunity, but this may be on the basis of an extension
of the executive immunity. 12 7 As stated previously, taking a deposi-
tion is not considered a judicial proceeding.128 There is a conflict of
authority on the immunity extended to hearings for pardons12 or
extradition. 130 These proceedings are not in any sense judicial, and
whether they should be covered by an absolute immunity must de-
116 Liles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631 (1885).
117 Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877, 20 A-L.R. 398 (1921).
11 Lamprecht v. Crane, 5 Ohio Dec. 753 (1880).
119 Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 84 Ohio St. 408, 95 N.E. 917, 38 L.RA.,
NS., 1913 (1911).
1203Bates v. State, 17 Ohio N.P., N.S., 193 (1914). Holds that selection of
jurors is not a judicial proceeding, but that the impaneling of jurors would
be a part thereof.
1 2 1 Liles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631 (1885); Harris v. Reams, 2 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 281 (1860).
122 Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. v. Hower, 124 Ohio St. 123, 177 N.E. 203 (1931).
123 Wilson v. Whitacre, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 392, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 15 (1889).
124 Preusser v. Faulhaber, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. 312, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S.,
312 (1909). Affd 82 Ohio St. 466, 92 N.E. 1111 (1910).
125 2 A.L. 1582 (1919).
126 Lamprecht v. Crane, 5 Ohio Dec. 753 (1880).
127 33 Am. JuR. LmEL A SLANDER §145.
123 Note, 90 A.L.I. 66 (1934).
12 9 Andrewv v. Gardner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341, 2 A.L.R. 1371 (1918);
note 2 A.L.R. 1376 (1919).
130 Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 112 S.W. 462 (1908).
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pend on the nature and scope of the executive immunity. Adminis-
trative agencies, while exercising a quasi-judicial function, are said
to be within the term judicial proceeding.131 An excellent example
of such an agency which often exercises a judicial function is the
Industrial Commission.132
Most of the cases concerning absolute privilege discuss, to some
extent, the problem of relevancy. In England, the requirement that
a statement must be relevant to the issue in order to be privileged
has been abandoned, and now the statement will not be actionable
if it has any relation to the proceeding.1 3 Some authorities hold that
the relevancy doctrine has been totally destroyed and any state-
ment before a judicial proceeding would be protected.13 4 The courts
in this country were rather hesitant to give such a broad privilege.
They -id not approve of the idea of using the courts as an instru-
ment for maliciousness and as a consequence of this feeling the rule
of relevancy was adopted.13 5 The majority of cases concerning abso-
lute privilege, except those dealing with state 36 and national'3 7 legis-
latures, have discussed and attempted to solve this problem. The
pertinency standard has been constantly liberalized.38
In Ohio, the liberalization of the rule has been complicated by
the first direct holding on the subject.13 9
... in order to be privileged, the statement must be pertinent
and material to the matter in hand. To be pertinent and
material it must tend to prove or disprove the point to be
established, and have substantial importance or influence in
producing the proper result. In other words, the statement
must be necessary to a full presentation and in that sense,
essential to the accomplishment of the object sought.140
(Emphasis added.)
This rule would seem to require relevancy in a strict, evidenti-
ary sense. By reference to rules in other states, and by interpreting
the Mauk case, the courts were able to greatly liberalize the re-
131 GATLEY, LiBEL AND SLANDER 181 (4th ed. 1953).
13 2 Beatty v. Baston, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 481 (1932).
133 PRosslm, ToRrs 825 (1941); Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation
Cases: Judicial Proceedings 9 COL. L. REv. 600, 604 (1909).
134 Note, 16 A.L.R 746 (1922); GATLE, LIBEL Am SrL'DE 169 (4th ed.
1953).
135 Lanning v. Christy, 30 Ohio St. 115 (1870). Relevancy first mentioned.
136 Ohio Const. Art. II §12, "... shall not be questioned elsewhere ... "
137 U.S Const. Art. I § VI. Same provision as Ohio.
133The trend is shown in notes 16 A.L.IR 746 (1922); 42 A.L.. 878
(1926); 134 A.L.R. 483 (1941).
13 9 Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152, 62 L.R.A. 477 (1903). Ex-
ecutive-administrative proceedings.
140 Id. at 97, 67 N.E. at 155.
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quirements of pertinency.' 41 None of the cases, however, have over-
ruled the older, more strict rule. By a rather indirect means the
Ohio Supreme Court apparently adopted a more liberal rule when
they stated:
... "occasion" has long been a word of art used by the court
when dealing with the problems of absolute privilege. It con-
notes a wider range than the discussion merely of the merits
of the central issue.142
By saying the occasion of the privilege is broader than the central
issue, the court has finally said that if the utterance has any rela-
tion to the proceedings it will be privileged. There are these prob-
lems, however; the court discussed the Mauk case, and did not ex-
pressly overrule it; they talked about "relevancy" at one point and
"occasion" at another. Besides this, a later Ohio case mimics the old
relevancy rule.14 3 Ohio law on this problem is evidently in a state
of confusion. Although the cases do clearly indicate that, the court
will be very favorable to the defendant's argument that the state-
ment is relevant - perhaps to the point of adopting the English rule.
The relevancy requirement should be especially broad so far
as concerns the witnesses and the parties, because of their lack of
familiarity with the rules of evidence. And, as was pointed out
before, a witness should be allowed to answer any question directed
to him, unless instructed not to, and should be allowed to volunteer
statements unless they are clearly uncalled for. The statement
does not lose its privilege because it concerns a person not a party
to the proceedings.144 Nor is the statement necessarily irrelevant
because it is struck from the pleadings, 145 or because it is not admis-
sible in evidence. 14 The trend of the relevancy doctrine is towards
the view of the Restatement - if the statement "has any relation" to
the proceeding it will be absolutely privileged.147 This view offers
a great deal more ease in administration and relieves parties in a
judicial proceeding of much of the risk. Relevancy has been pretty
largely a dead issue for many years, so why not bury the bones?
LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS
It is an undoubted necessity of parliamentary government that
the members of the legislature have freedom of speech. Present-day
141 Ruden v. Fauver, 9 Ohio N.P., N.S., 289 (1909), aifd 23 Ohio Cir. Dec.
315, 315, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S., 30, 31 (1909): [No need to question relevancy]
".... further than to say that they have no such obvious irrelevancy or other
want of relation to the action as to put them out of the pale of privilege"; The
Erie County Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Crecelius, 122 Ohio St. 210, 171 N.E. 97 (1930).
142 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 587, 37 NE.2d 584, 591 (1941).
143 Kinter v. Kinter, 84 Ohio App. 399, 87 N.E.2d 389, 39 Ohio Op. 517 (1949).
144 Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 SZ.. 2d 481 (1952).
145 Note, 134 A.L.R. 483 (1941).
146Veazy v. Blair, 86 Ga. App. 721, 72 S.E.2d 481 (1952).
14 7 RbsTATLrmNT, ToRTs §§585-589;
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hearings and investigations, however, have caused doubt to arise in
some persons' minds. For this reason, this section of the comment
will attempt particularly to evaluate various sanctions.
Legislative immunity developed from the struggle between the
Crown and the House of Commons. The privilege of the House of
Lords was apparently never questioned. Perhaps this was because
they functioned as a court, as well as a legislature, but the more
practical reason is the great wealth and influence of the Lords. At
first the immunity became a custom which was allowed because
of the grace of the king. During this period there were disagree-
ments as to the extent of the immunity and Elizabeth completely
ignored it. After the Glorious Revolution, however, when the law
of the Parliament became supreme, the immunity was given statu-
tory and constitutional sanction. The Ninth Article of the Bill of
Rights provided:
That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in
Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any
court or place out of Parliament. 148
Practically every country which uses a parliamentary form of
government makes the legislator immune from action for words used
while he was performing his legislative function. 4 0
In this country legislative immunity became a part of the com-
mon law, and many legislatures adopted the immunity as a matter
of course. When many of the state constitutions and the Federal
Constitution were drafted, they contained an express provision for
legislative immunity.150 Thus, there is a twofold basis for the legis-
lative immunity which creates some problems of analysis which will
be discussed later.
This immunity, which was originally aimed only at protection
from the executive branch, is now a general protection from action
by anyone. The "majority rule"- seems to be that the immunity
only extends to state and national legislatures.151 The argument for
limiting the privilege to state and national legislators is that the
county and municipal officer's functions are not so vital and, there-
fore, that a qualified immunity is enough. Statements may also be
found that there is no requirement of relevancy of the statements.
52
1481 WIMIAmI AND MARy, Sess. 2 c.2.
149 MAy, PARLIA2MENTARY PRACTICE 46-52 (15th ed. 1950); Yankvich, The
Immunity of Congressional Speech -Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U.
oF PA. L. REv. 960 (1950-51); Veeder, Defamation, Absolute Immunity In Leg-
islative Proceedings, 10 Co. L. REv. 131 (1910).
150 Omo CozsT. ART. I § 12; U.S. CONST. ART. I §6. Note the similarity to
the English Bill of Rights provision.
151 Greenwood v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449, 42 N.W. 413 (1889); RESTATEn,
TonTS §590; PROSSER, TORTS 827-829 (1941).
152 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §590.
[Vol. 15
COMMENTS
This of course ignores the dual basis for the privilege. If the state-
ment is protected by a constitutional provision, the immunity will
probably be absolute and there will be no pertinency requirement.
On the other hand if the immunity is based on the common law
rules in this country, there will be the same relevancy require-
ments as were discussed in the Judicial Proceedings section. The
immunity will extend to action in committees by the legislator,153
and a witness before a legislative committee will be treated the same
as a witness at a trial 54 The immunity only extends to the state-
ment, and if the legislator were to publish the defamatory matter
at some other place it would not be absolutely privileged, even if
the republication were only handing out copies of the Congressional
Record.'L)
The authority in Ohio concerning this matter is rather meager.
The constitutional provision should protect our state legislators
from civil or criminal actions for libel and slander, and apparently
it has been quite effective, because there is no reported case in Ohio
dealing with such an action against a state legislator. The Consti-
tution of Ohio, Article 11, Section 12, provides:
And for any speech, or debate, in either House, they shall
not be questioned elsewhere.
This provision makes it clear that there is no requirement of rele-
vancy if a senator or representative seeks the immunity. The im-
.munity in Ohio would probably be extended to county and local
officers as well. 156 The immunity to these officers is, of course,
based on the common law, not the constitution, as the latter applies
only to state senators and representatives. This shows clearly why
it was necessary in the Tanner case to discuss relevancy. The court
of appeals in holding a preamble to an official entry by the county
commissioner absolutely immune'57 unfortunately did not discuss
the policy reasons for their decision but instead said they were
stating the general rule in this country which they plainly were not.
From a policy viewpoint it would seem better to require good faith
on the part of local officials. The Supreme Court of Ohio in Bigelow
v. Brumley'58 expressly recognized the twofold basis for legislative
l53 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Van Ripen v. Tumulty, 26
N.J. Misc. 37, 56 A.2d 611 (1948).
1S4 Sheppard v. Bryant, 191 Mass. 591, 78 N.E. 394 (1906).
1ss Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386, 94 A-L.R. 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
156 Tanner v. Gault, 20 Ohio App. 243, 153 NX.. 124, 24 Ohio L. R. 315 (1925)
motion to certify overruled, 24 Ohio LI.R 50 (1925).
157 It is interesting to note that the court says that Mauk v. Brundage, 68
Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152 (1903), is the Ohio rule on relevancy, but in the
Mauk case it was held that a preamble to a resolution by a board of health
was mere surplusage and not absolutely privileged. This indicates the liberal-
ization of the relevancy requirement.
158 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941).
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immunity and held that the constitutional provision recognizes, but
does not restrict, the immunity. In this case the court said that a
committee appointed by the governor to prepare the official argu-
ment in a proposed constitutional amendment by initiative procedure
were absolutely immune if the matter contained in the argument
was relevant. This shows the value of the common law-constitu-
tional distinction even in states where local officials do not have
an absolute immunity. Although the Ohio authority is meager,
there is no good reason to assume that a later case would come out
differently with the possible exception of a case involving a county
commissioner, city councilman, or some other local legislator.
Whether a petition directed to the legislature is absolutely im-
mune is a little litigated question. An early English case held that
such petitions were absolutely immune.159 This case has been ex-
plained, however, on the basis that the Parliament was acting in a
judicial capacity.160 This same commentator goes on to say that,
unlike a judicial proceeding, the legislator has no chance to vindi-
cate himself, while the petition remains on the public records. This
argument lacks validity because the same inability to re-establish
oneself is present in the case of a debate or speech by a legislator
which contains defamatory matter concerning a third party who is
not a legislator. It has been held, however, that a petition for re-
call was only qualifiedly privileged.161 The most usual type of
petition and the type most likely to be defamatory is the recall pe-
tition. A recall petition is a method of removal of public officers
by vote of the electors in an election held for such purpose. 1 62 In
Ohio we have constitutional recognition of initiative and referen-
dum,, 1 3 but nothing directly on recall. Article II §1 of the Ohio
Constitution is not broad enough to allow recall. 1 4 There is a
statutory provision for recall of municipal officers, 165 but the statute
has been held unconstitutional by an Ohio Court of Appeals,166
and there is strong indication that the Supreme Court of Ohio
would do likewise.1 6 7 The reason for this is that Article II §38 of
the Constitution of Ohio is exclusive, except for other express
159 Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 131, 85 Eng. Rep. 137 (1680).
160 Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation Cases: Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Proceedings, 10 CoL. L. REV. 131, 138 (1910).
161 State v. Wilson, 137 Wash. 125, 241 Pac. 970, 43 A.L.R. 1263 (1925).
162 28 Am. JuR. INsATivW, REFERrEimU, AND REcALL §48.
1 63 OMo CoxsT. ART. II §1.
164 State ex. rel. v. Ducy, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 467, 44 N.E.2d 803 (1942).
16S ORIO REv. CODE §705.92 (3515-71).
166 State ex r-el. v. Ducy, supra, n. 164.
167 State ex rel. v. Brown, 105 Ohio St. 479, 138 N.E. 230 (1922). But if
a city under a home rule charter adopts a provision for recall, it will be
Constitutional. State ex rel. v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N.E.2d 769 (1948).
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constitutional provisions, and it provides that officers shall be re-
moved only "upon complaint and hearing." Thus, it is doubtful in
Ohio that we will have much problem with libel actions based on
petitions to the legislature.
This is the present condition of legislative immunity. A situ-
ation exists wherein we have placed all the emphasis on the so-
cietal side of the scales and have paid no attention to the protec-
tion of the individual. There has been a vigilant protection of the
legislator, so that he will have no fear of speaking out; thus society
will be better represented. But the individual may have his char-
acter and reputation ruined by the use of completely unreliable
evidence with little, or no chance to vindicate himself. It would ap-
pear that in our necessary and vital battle against communism and
fascism we are giving up many of the principles which we are
fighting so hard to protect. The greatest virtue of our govern-
ment has been the right to think and believe as you please, and
the protection we have afforded to non-conformists even in times
of great stress is the sign of a truly strong constitutional govern-
ment. 6 8 Our legislative branch of government, however, is
equally as vital and care must be taken that we do not destroy this
important part of our governmental structure when we are trying
to protect the individual.
At present there are at least four limiting forces or sanctions
available to guard against the improper use of the legislative im-
munity. They are the internal rules of the legislature, the crime of
perjury, recall petitions and public opinion. Note that none of
these methods could be carried into force by the individual alone.
Article II, Section 8, of the Ohio Constitution 169 provides:
Each house, except as otherwise provided in the constitu-
tion, shall choose its own officers, may determine its own
rules of proceeding, punish its members for disorderly
conduct; and with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a
member...
If this sanction was actually an operative one, there would be no
need to discuss further the problems of finding an adequate sanc-
tion. The problem is that this sanction has been little used.170
Seemingly the legislature would want to show that they were op-
posed to unlimited calumny, but apparently they think it is a blot
on the whole legislature if they punish one of their members. It
would seem better that the legislature put "their own homes in or-
der," but it appears very unlikely that they will do this.
168 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
169 U.S. Comm ATr . I §5 is a similar provision.
170Yankwick, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Mean-
ing and Scope, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 960, 970 (1950-51).
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A witness may be limited to some extent in what he testifies
to before a legislative committee because of the perjury sanction.171
The difficulty with perjury is that it is hard to prove and would
apply only to witnesses before committees and not to the legis-
lators. "Perjury must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses,
or of one witness and corroborating circumstances."'172 There is
also the problem of political pressure on the official not to start
prosecution against a friendly or influential witness. With these
weaknesses, it becomes manifest that perjury is not an effective
sanction.
A recall petition could be a very strong and direct sanction
for the people. An aroused public opinion is required in order to
recall an officer; so an individual could not bring the action with-
out public support. In Ohio, as was pointed out before, removal of
an officer may be had only on a hearing in court,17 3 but our re-
moval procedure would be available if the legislator had really
gotten "out of bounds." The recent "Joe Must Go" campaign gives
some indication of the problem of getting enough valid signa-
tures to require an election.
If public opinion were strong enough, we would need no
other sanction. But the people of this country have become quite
docile about giving up their liberties, and are more and more
willing to rely on a paternalistic government. So long as the lead-
ers of the government are honest and faithful this is acceptable, but
what if power-hungry and vicious men were given this great amount
of power and control over our daily lives? The answer is ob-
vious. Our educational system must take it upon itself to
develop an awareness of the problem and an active interest in our
governmental structure. At present, however, public opinion is a
weak sanction. Along the same line is the need for better legislators
and more responsible newspapers. But this cure is also very un-
likely.
There have been various suggestions for the adoption of pro-
cedural safeguards to prevent the unchecked issuance of defamatory
statements. 7 4 Examples of suggested safeguards are: that inter-
ested parties be given notice of the nature of the investigations;
that a person should have the right to make a statement if his name
was raised in an unpleasant manner; that interested parties should
be given the right to call witnesses and cross examine others; and
that a witness may be represented by an informed counsel who
171 OMO REV. CODE §101.44 (60), provides in part that " . . . This section
does not exempt a witness from the penalty of perjury."
172 Omo REv. CODE §2945.62 (13444-22).
173 OMio CoNsT. AR. II §38; OMo REV. CODE §§3.07-3.10 (10-1 to 10-4).
174 Note, 16 U. or Cn. L. Ray. 544 (1948-49).
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would take an active part. These safeguards would limit to some
extent the "character assassination" which continues daily, but
there are serious limitations to them. These safeguards have been
adopted in some committees and the result was not too good.17
There was no marked decrease of harmful statements. Also, in
times of stress it is vital that the legislature be able to operate
with dispatch, and this speed of investigation is the very value of
committee action. 76 Therefore, it does not appear that the adoption
of burdensome court procedure is the answer. However, it would
be quite proper to adopt some of the procedural safeguards, at
least those which do not hamper legislative investigations to any
great extent.
Complete abolition of the legislative privilege by a constitu-
tional amendment has been suggested.177 This state of affairs of
course would give the individual complete protection, but it would
completely ignore any societal ends. A legislator would be afraid
to open his mouth, and as a consequence the people would not be
properly represented. There would even be a great likelihood that
our entire representative form of legislature would collapse or
lose all its vitality. The legislative immunity is an absolute necessi-
ty for our form of government and it should not be abolished be-
cause a few have abused it.
The most practical and feasible suggestion for curbing the
abuser while still maintaining the immunity is that the person de-
famed be allowed to bring an action for damages against the
government. 78 The first idea was to expand the Federal Torts
Claims Act to include the historical action of libel and slander.
This has great merit, and would be another step toward curing
the mistake of transferring governmental immunity to this coun-
try from England. In this country the people, not the government,
are supreme, and the government in this country "can do wrong."
Professor Green would go one step further and create a new type
of remedy more favorable to the party defamed. A new remedy
must always be interrupted by the courts, while we have a good
knowledge of the reactions of courts to an established action. The
criticism of an action of libel and slander do not overcome this.
The solution, then, until public opinion is aroused and we
get higher quality legislators, is to grant a party who is defamed
a cause of action against the government. The legislator would still
17S Id. at 549.
176Green, Public Destruction of Private Reputation-A Remedy?, 38
MnqN. L. Rzv. 577 (1954).
17 Yankwick, The Immunity of Congressiorna Speech-Its Origin, Mean-
ing and Scope, 99 U. or PA. L. R1v. 960, 973 (1950-51).
178 Green, supra, n. 176; Yankwick, supra, n. 177.
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be free to say anything he wanted to in the exercise of his duty, and
the individual would be at least partly compensated for his in-
jury. The effect of a trial on the merits, even though not directly
against the legislator, might have a very favorable effect on what
the legislator said. This approach will come very near to reaching
the proper balance between the individual and the group.
EXECUTV PROCEEDINGS
Even with the tremendous expansion of the executive branches
of government in the past two decades, the amount of executive
defamation and the comment it has aroused is very trivial. No very
good reason is apparent unless it is the relative uncertainty of the
extent of the immunity and the requirement that the statement be
relevant. No matter what the reason, in comparison with the leg-
islature, the executive branch has not abused their immunity.
The problems here then, are mostly in the nature of defining the
extent of the immunity.
It is very well settled that the highest officers of our nation
and state are within the immunity.179 This would clearly include
the President and his cabinet,180 and the equivalent of these officers
at the state level.181 This immunity is circumscribed, however, by
the requirement that the statement made be pertinent and that it
be made in the course of the executive's duty. The relevancy prob-
lem is quite similar to that discussed under the judicial section
and it need only be pointed out that relevancy here is not used in
a strict logical sense.8 2
One of the most difficult problems in this matter of executive
immunity is to which, if any, minor officials the immunity is ex-
tended. The majority of states would hold, as to local officials, that
the immunity is not absolute. 8 3 However, Michigan would extend
the privilege to local executives. 84 Although the authority is very
sparse in Ohio as to local officials, one court of appeals opinion' 5
held that an absolute immunity extended to a county commissioner.
179 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584, 21 Ohio Op. 471
(1941); Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895); REsTATErE, TORTs §591; PnossEa, Toars 829 (1941).
180 Spalding v. Vilas, note 179, supra; Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir.
1940); Cert. denied 311 U. S. 718 (1941). Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. 2d
168 (D.C. Cir. 1927). No cases of a suit against the President.
181 Bigelow v. Brumley, supra, n. 179; Matson v. Margiotti, supra, n. 179.
182 See discussion p. 344, supra.
183Mills v. Denny, - Iowa - , 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954); Greenwood v.
Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449, 42 N.W. 413 (1889); 33 A. Jua. LuEL AND SLAxmr §144.
I4 Trebelcock v. Anderson, 117 Mich. 39, 75 N.W. 129 (198); Note 44
Mrca. L. REV. 871 (1945-48).
185 Tanner v. Gault, 20 Ohio App. 243, 153 N-. 124 (1925) motion to cer-
tify overruled, 24 Ohio L. R. 50 (1925).
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Even though this was a legislative case, it would be logical to ex-
tend the same immunity to minor executives. From a policy view-
point, though, when it is remembered that the basis of the im-
munity is to prevent the harassment of public officers in order
that they may perform their important functions, it would seem
that a qualified immunity is sufficient.
Minor officials, under an executive who has an absolute im-
munity, or one who carries on important functions,'86 and army
and navy officers 187 present the more difficult problem. The first
group is protected by a vicarious immunity, i.e., its members are
the agents of the person who has the immunity performing his
duties, so it is only proper they should get his immunities. 88 The
agent, however, must not go beyond the scope of his duties and
this is the reason why the immunity is often said only to be
vertical.18 9 This means that a minor official only has a duty to
make statements to his superiors, and not to other departments
or to the public. If, however, the minor executive had a duty to
make reports to other branches there is no apparent reason why
he would not be horizontally immune. This terminology seems
useless and the better way to understand this is on the basis of an
agency theory. There is a definite limit as to the extent of the
vicarious immunity which needs to be pointed out. The function
that the "agent-junior executive" is performing must be an impor-
tant one. The classic example of this is that the immunity of the
Postmaster General does not extend to a janitor in a local post of-
fice.
The last mentioned limitation, i.e., importance of functions,
may well do away with any need for a delegated immunity. If a
lower executive performs a function which is so important that
the public welfare demands that he be free to act, then the immunity
should be original with the official. With our original concept of
balancing applied it would seem quite logical that an individual who
performed such a function would be absolutely immune no mat-
ter what his title may be. But the courts are likely to continue
this trend of approaching these problems in traditional manner,
and therefore the minor official would argue he gets his immunity
from his departmental chief.
The immunity extended to servicemen is rather uncertain in
this country because of the sparsity of cases. Nothing would seem
more likely than that a high officer in the armed forces during
time of war should be free of harassment in carrying out his
186 Love v. Snyder, 184 F. 2d 840 (6th Cir. 1950).
187 33 Am Jus. LmT AN SLANErt §145.
188 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941).
189 Comment, 20 U. oF CHL L. REv. 677 (1953).
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functions. The need for decision is immediate and questionable
people are likely to suffer, but the public need for protection over-
balances a large amount of individual invasion. 90
There is a definite conflict in determining whether communi-
cations by and to law enforcement officers are absolutely immune.191
In Ohio a communication to a police officer is probably only quali-
fiedly immune.192 The F.B.I. has a rather different position. It
would seem better on policy grounds that all police communica-
tions be only qualified. But in the case of the F.B.I. where a state-
ment is made to an officer by an informant, the proof of the case
could be made impossible by the government's exercising its evi-
dentiary privilege to exclude any statements made between an
officer and a third party. This privilege is to be distinguished from
the immunity in most libel cases, in which it is possible to prove
facts sufficient to allow recovery, but because of the circumstances
existing at the time, no recovery is allowed. In the evidentiary
privilege as it applies here, the defamed party is unable to recover,
because it is impossible to present any evidence that the defamatory
statements were made. 19s This, in effect, shifts the matter of
deciding whether a particular situation is privileged from the ju-
diciary to the executive, but in the case of the F.B.I., where classi-
fied material is handled, this method prevents a complete ex-
posure of the statements with a very good possibility that even if
they were presented no recovery would be allowed.194 The enforce-
ment of the law will not be greatly impeded by the requirement
that statements made by and to an officer be made in good faith.
Assuming for the moment we have an executive who is in a
position to be immune, how can it be predicted whether his state-
ments will be immune? The statement must be a necessary part
of the communication; the communication must be reasonably re-
lated to the duties of the officer; and the communication must be
made to a proper person.195 These are mere words and of little help,
but it will be remembered when vertical and horizontal immunity
were discussed, that this carries the idea to whom the statement
is made. Statements to the public through the press is the out-
side limit of "to whom the statement is made," but it may very
190 For Brief discussion and the few unsatisfactory case see, 33 Am Jui.
Tam, AND Sr.A- i §145.
191 Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 331 (1883); Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135
N.E. 315 (1922); note, 140 A.L.RP 1466 (1942).
192 Popke v. Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 NE. 248 (1926).
193 Comment, 51 COL. L. RPv. 244 (1951).
194 Foltz v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 189 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. de-
nied 342 U.S. 871 (1951).
195 Comment, 20 U. OF CHL L. Rsv. 677 (1953); note 132 A.L 1340 (1941).
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well be the duty of the executive to communicate to the public.1'"
The Matson case indicates the extreme periphery of the ex-
ecutive privilege. In that case the Attorney General of Penn-
sylvania wrote to a city district attorney and said that one of the
latter's assistants was a communist. The letter was released to
the press before it was sent, and the Attorney General had no pow-
er over the removal of assistant district attorneys. The court held
that the entire chain of publications was absolutely immune. It
is a rather close question whether it is the duty of the Attorney
General to advise the dismissal of an employee over whom he has
no direct authority. It is also questionable whether there was a
real necessity and duty to have the letter released to the press
before the district attorney decided what action to take. Nonethe-
less this case does indicate a liberal flexible immunity which gives
the executive the necessary freedom he requires to properly carry
out his functions and in that sense the case is good. But did the
court forget to consider the individual's rights?
There is one problem which pervades the whole area, i.e., theimmunity which is extended to a fair and accurate report of abso-
lutely immune proceedings. The rule seems clearly to be that
the privilege is only qualified.9 7 It seems logical to say that if
the person who made the statements is absolutely immune so should
be the paper which quotes him. But the requirement that the pub-
lication be in good faith and not malicious does not greatly hamper
the press, and it will protect an individual from malicious defama-
tion.
The need for a sanction does not appear pressing in the area of
the executive branch. Perhaps this is because of the many limi-
tations on the immunity itself. If this is true, as it appears to be,
might not the answer to the rather difficult legislative problem be
to revoke the constitutional provisions and retain the common
law absolute immunity with its more stringent requirements and
thus solve that problem.
If a sanction is needed many of the provisions suggested in
other Sections will apply with equal force here.
ADINiSTRATIna PRocEEiNG
To treat the administrative as a separate problem in a "priv-
ilege" article is a relatively new approach. The Restatement and
most of the experts stick in a few sentences about "quasi" proced-
196Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1940) cert. denied 311 US.
718 (1941); Matson v. Margiotti; 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952).
197 Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 84 Ohio St. 408, 95 NME_ 917, 38 L.R.J.,
N.S., 1913 (1911); Post Publishing Co. v. Maloney, 50 Ohio St. 74 33 N.E. 921
(1893); Heimlich v. Dispatch Printing Co., 26 Ohio Dec. 234, 18 Ohio N.P.,
M.S., 505 (1916).
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ings and that is all that is done. Some law reviews recently have
decided to approach this matter directly and by analysis fit to-
gether some logical pattern for the cases involving administrative
agencies. 9 8 Their plight is clear. How can a person fit together
cases in a logical way which have not been approached in an
orderly manner?
The present basis for deciding whether an utterance made in
an administrative proceeding has an immunity is to see how close
an analogy there is between the agency and a court, executive or
some other absolutely privileged group.199 Deciding that an agency
is quasi-judicial in nature does not answer the question of whether
there should be an immunity. It may be said that there is a real
value in the use of judicial procedure by an agency that has an
absolute immunity, in that there will be a more mature and con-
servative approach in which the chance for "reputation slaughter"
is much less likely. But to say that judicial function is required
seems entirely immaterial. The approach of today may have more
logic than the writer has allowed it, because the importance of
the function of the agency has a high correlation to whether abso-
lute immunity is extended. 200 But by and large the problem would
be greatly simplified if the administrative area, which grew up aft-
er rules of immunity were settled, were separately approached.
The same basis as was applied in the established areas for deciding
the area of immunity should be applied now in deciding the extent
of the immunity in the administrative cases.
In Ohio the rule is that, in the case of failure of analogy to a
court or other "privileged" group, the immunity extended to an
administrative agency is only a qualified one.201 The common pleas
198 See Notes 97 U. op PA. L. REV. 877 (1948-49); 18 OHLA. L. REv. 1138
(1947); 13 Mo. L. REv. 320 (1948).
1 99This accounts for the vain attempt by the common pleas court in
Meyers v. Parr to say the Board of Embalmers was exercising a judicial
function. Meyers v. Parr, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 467, 19 Ohio Op. 543, 6 Ohio Supp.
209 (1941), reversed, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 NXE. 2d 637, 24 Ohio Op. 110, 34
Ohio L. Abs. 448 (1941). See also Wilson v. Whitacre, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec.- 392,
4 Ohio Cir. Rep. 15 (1889); White v. United Mills Co., 208 S.W. 2d 803 (Mo.
1948).
200Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W.2d 767
(1933); Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 166 Tenn. 498, 63 S.W.2d 663
(1933). Statements to state insurance commissioner held absolutely privileged
in one case only qualified in the other. Problem is that the Hunter case could
be based on the fact the statement is outside the commissioner's duty. See
also note 198, supra.
201 Meyers v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 448,
24 Ohio Op. 110 (1941) common pleas report 33 Ohio L. Abs. 467, 19 Ohio Op.
543, 6 Ohio Supp. 209 (1941); Patterson v. Kincaid, 44 Ohio App. 154, 184 N.E.
705 (1932); But cf. Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152 (103). In
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court in the Meyers case dealt at length on the board's subpoena
powers, court-like hearing, and right to appeal. From these pro-
cedural methods they decided the agency was exercising a judicial
function. The court of appeals reversed. They found that the board
was not exercising a judicial function, because by the Constitution
of Ohio judges must be elected and the administrators were not.
Although their basis seems rather shaky, the court properly de-
cided that the Board of Embalmers was an administrative agency
and not some magical, quasi-court. From this point on the opinion
of the court treats the problem of whether absolute immunity should
be extended to administrative agencies. They decide not. The basis
seems to be that a conditional immunity is sufficient to protect the
public interest, and yet the private reputation will be given adequate
protection. The difficulty with the case is that the court tries to
decide whether all administrative agencies should have an absoluteimmunity and not whether an absolute immunity should extend to
the Board of Embalmers.
The Meyers case may indicate the approach to be taken. It
would be well and proper to look, as did the common pleas court,
at the internal procedure of the agency, not to see if they were a
quasi court, but instead to determine how capable and accountable
they would be if they were afforded this great power. Unquestion-
ably the proper approach to the problem is to face it directly. We
also have the basic policy of balancing the societal needs against
the private reputation; and besides this, the wisdom and the mis-
takes in other areas of absolute immunity are available for our
edification, waving red flags that will help to keep us on the right
paths.
As was pointed out before, the Meyers case attempted to decide
the problem for the entire administrative area. Each agency should
be treated separately, and even then it might be wise to look at the
particular function.2 0 2 However, since the vital element from the
societal viewpoint is freedom from fear of harassment and damage
by public officers, it would be much better to either grant an agency
immunity for all its functions or refuse the absolute immunity en-
tirely. In deciding whether an agency should have an immunity we
should once more get out our scales and put on one side the impor-
tance of the function the agency is to perform and on the other the
likely injury to the reputation of the individual members of our na-
tion, and if the public importance weighs the heavier, then an abso-
lute immunity should be granted. But on the other hand, if the pri-
vate interest side were the heavier, keeping in mind the added
which the supreme court strongly indicates that relevant proceedings be-
fore a board of health would be absolutely privileged.
202 See note 200, supra.
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weight afforded to this by the Due Process Clause, then the im-
munity would not be absolute, but only qualified.
The administrative immunity problem has been rather poorly
handled, but as soon as the courts cleat away the underbrush and
approach the problem in its real light-as a separate area of govern-
ment - the problem should be solved in an accurate and proper
manner.
CoAnMUIcATIoNs BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WiFE
The question of immunity is rarely presented in cases where
there is a defamatory communication between a husband and wife.
Traditionally the courts have taken the position that there is no pub-
lication in this situation and therefore no actionable defamation. 203
The reason being that a husband and wife are regarded as one per-
son insofar as the publishing of defamatory statements are con-
cerned.20 4 The courts say that it is the same as talking to "oneself"
when a husband is speaking to his wife.205 This theory is an absurd
legal fiction and has been wisely and properly refuted in other areas
of the law20 6 as it should be in the defamation sector. The incon-
sistency of the "singleness" approach is brought out by a factual
situation in which a third party makes a defamatory statement to
one spouse about the other spouse. In this type of case, the courts
hold that there has been a sufficient publication on which to base
an action of libel or slander.20 7 If the parties to a marriage were
really "one" person for defamation purposes there could be no re-
covery in the aforementioned hypothetical situation, because a de-
famatory statement made only to the person defamed does not
amount to an actionable publication.20 8 To apply this "singleness"
theory of marriage to the situation where the statement is made by
one spouse to the other and not to apply it where the statement is
made to the spouse by a third party is completely illogical unless
the courts are covertly balancing the interests and then rationaliz-
ing the proper result by a fictional approach. There can be little
doubt, however, that in the communications between spouses there
is an actionable publication if the occasion is not privileged. 2Y Since
no Ohio case has determined this issue, it is suggested that, if the
courts of this state are ever presented with such a problem, they
cast aside this "fictional veil" and decide the case on the actual
issues presented.
The actual problem presented is whether the public interest
203 PnossER, TORTS 831 (1941); note 78 A.LLJ. 1182 (1932).
204 GATLEY, LIBEL Am SLANER 103 (4th ed. 1953).
205 Note 78 AL!R 1182 (1932).
206 O o REv. CoDE § §3103.01-3103.08 (8002-1 to 8002-8).
207 Duval v. Davey, 32 Ohio St. 604 (1877).
208 Steele v. Edwards, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct 52, 8 Ohio Cir. Dec. 161 (1898).
209 25 0. JuR. LuFjn AN SLNiwsa §41.
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in preserving a confidential relationship between a husband and
wife overbalances the injury that will be done to the reputations
of the individuals defamed.210 In other words, whether this type of
case presents the circumstances necessary for the granting of an
immunity. Although it is quite necessary not to confuse evidentiary
privilege and defamatory immunity,2 1 1 it will be helpful at this point
to discuss the evidentiary privilege extending to communications be-
tween husband and wife for the purpose of ascertaining the policy
views of the court. The basis of the evidentiary privilege is that a
spouse should feel perfectly free to disclose his thoughts to his mate
without fear of the words coming back to him in the form of a
petition or in an indictment.212 If an absolute immunity were to be
extended to defamation cases, it would be on this same basis. 213 The
evidentiary privilege belongs at least to the spouse making the com-
munications,214 thus if an action based on statements to one's spouse
were brought against the spouse, he could defeat any recovery by
having the evidence necessary for the plaintiff to establish his cause
of action excluded, i.e., the cofmmunication of the defamatory state-
ment to his spouse.2 1 5 This shows that the policy of the courts as
determined from the law of evidence would indicate that an absolute
immunity should be granted to spouses for defamatory communica-
tions between themselves about third parties. There is an additional
cogent reason for saying that Ohio would grant an absolute immunity
as opposed to a qualified immunity. This is that the evidentiary
husband and wife privilege in Ohio is, perhaps, a rule of ex-
clusion210 instead of the usual rule which would at least limit the
power to exclude the evidence to one or both of the marital part-
ners.217 Although this Ohio case 218 is subject to criticism, it does
indicate a strong policy stand that the confidence of the marital
partner should be protected. The American Law Institute has taken
the position that communications between spouses should be abso-
lutely privileged.219 Although it is doubtful that this is a restatement
210 See note 8, supra.
21 1 Taplin-Pice-Clerkin Co. v. Hower, 124 Ohio St. 123, 177 N.E. 203 (1931).
2 2 WIGUMORE, EVMENCE §2332 (3rd ed. 1940).
213 RESTATEMENT, ToRns §592 Comment a.
2 14 WGMOPiE, EV'hENcE §2340 (3rd ed. 1940).
21S This view is analogous to that suggested in the cases involving com-
munications to F.B.I. officers where the government has an exclusionary priv-
ilege. 51 COL. L. REv. 244 (1951).
216 Dick v. Hyer, 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N.E. 251 (1916) third party allowed to
exclude communication between husband and wife. The decision is open to
criticism from an evidentiary viewpoint, but it clearly states the strong Ohio
policy in favor of protecting marital confidence.
217 WIGMORE, EvmENcE §2340 (3rd ed. 1940).
218 Dick v. Hyer, supra, n. 216.
219 RESTATEMENT, Tors §592: "A husband or a wife is absolutely privileged
to publish to the other spouse false and defamatory matter of a third person."
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of the common law view, it does seem to be a proper analysis of
the situation. It must be admitted that the traditional approach
reaches the proper result, but it achieves that end by a very "mysti-
cal" approach.
It is the generally prevailing opinion that only a conditional
immunity will be extended to relatives, other than husband and
wife, for defamatory communications among themselves.20
CONCLUSION
-Absolute immunity has, in general, reached a proper level of
development in the judicial and executive areas of our government.
The relevancy requirement is becoming of less effect, but not to the
point where it is valueless. This requirement that a statement be
pertinent has a deterrent effect which is not found in the legislative
proceeding.
The legislative area presents the most immediate and challeng-
ing problem. Individual reputation, at the moment, represents a
small price for political prominence, and conviction without evidence
indicates "proper" procedure. Allowing an injured party an action
against the government appears to be the temporary answer, until
the great forum of public opinion becomes aroused and puts an end
to this dilemma.
The courts in the administrative cases in the future should ap-
proach the problem directly and decide the issue by balancing
societal ends against individual reputation. The approach should be
to determine the privilege for each agency individually and not as
a group.
These are the problems. Will we be able to save this immunity
which has given our government officials that freedom and fear-
lessness which has made our government great, and allowed states-
men to entertain and advocate unpopular views? We can not lightly
discard this element of our government. On the other hand, will
there continue, so long as we have this immunity, a mass of reputa-
tion "murders" based on incompetent witnesses? This cannot be
shrugged off as another element of our complex society. No, the
answer rests simply in a return to respect for the rights which plain-
ly belong to every individual by our officials and by "We the
people."
David W. Caroll
220 GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 229-232 (4th ed. 1953); note, 78 A.LR. 1182
(1932).
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